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2.1  Introduction 
Two striking facts characterize the recent fiscal policy of a number of coun- 
tries. First, since 1973 there has been a pronounced and systematic increase in 
government spending and budget deficits (both measured as a percentage of 
GDP). This is true of both OECD economies and developing countries such as 
those in Latin America.'  Second, in some cases fast debt accumulation has 
been allowed to go on unchecked for long periods of time, giving rise to a path 
that is inconsistent with intertemporal solvency. In some extreme cases, such 
as those of Mexico, Argentina, and Bolivia in the 1980s, drastic changes in 
spending and taxes were eventually required to restore solvency. In other seri- 
ous but less dramatic cases-such  as those of  Belgium and Italy, where the 
public debt is above 100 percent of GNP and growing-lasting  fiscal stabiliza- 
tion is yet to occur. 
Neither feature is easy to reconcile with the neoclassical model (Barro 1979) 
that views debt accumulation as a way to spread over time the costs of distor- 
tionary taxation. While the neoclassical model fits the U.S. data reasonably 
well (Barro 1986), cyclical and intertemporal smoothing factors cannot fully 
account for the recent increase in peacetime deficits in OECD countries (Rou- 
bini and Sachs 1989).*  Furthermore, the tax-smoothing model does not seem 
AndrCs Velasco is associate professor of economics at New York University and a faculty re- 
search fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
1. On the OECD, see Alesina and Perotti  1994. The fiscal experience of a number of  Latin 
American countries is also reported and analyzed in Tornell and Velasco 1995 and references 
therein. See also the essays in Larrain and Selowsky 1991. 
2. In a recent paper, Bizer and Durlauf (1990) argue that US. tax rates do not seem to be a 
random walk, as implied by  the theory. Rather, they find an eight-year cycle for tax changes, a 
feature suggestive of a political equilibrium. 
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to fit the budget data from developing countries (Edwards and Tabellini 1991; 
Roubini 1991). 
Even harder to justify as the result of rational government action are the debt 
bubbles (and sometimes the accompanying inflation) that occur when stabiliza- 
tion is delayed, as discussed by Alesina and Drazen (1991). If the need for an 
eventual fiscal correction can be foreseen, nothing can be gained by  waiting. 
This is especially true if  distortionary taxes, especially inflation, are heavily 
used during the transition. 
This paper  develops a political-economic  model of  government  behavior 
that can throw light on both  of  these puzzles. To  do so, it goes beyond  the 
standard model of  a representative  individual and a benevolent  policymaker 
bent on maximizing the individual’s welfare. It considers a society divided into 
several influential interest groups, each of which benefits from a particular kind 
of government spending. The government is assumed to be weak, in that each 
of the interest groups can influence fiscal authorities to set net transfers on the 
group’s target item at some desired level. Hence,  we have a case of  “frag- 
mented” fiscal policymaking. 
This setup can be interpreted in one of several ways, all of which have coun- 
terparts in countries’  recent experience. First, spending pressures may  arise 
from sectoral ministers or parliamentary committees with special interests that 
overwhelm a weak finance minister. In a detailed set of studies of the European 
Community in the  1970s and  1980s, von Hagen (1992) and von Hagen and 
Harden (1994) conclude that budgeting procedures that lend the finance minis- 
ter “strategic dominance over spending ministers” and “limit the amendment 
powers of parliament” are strongly conducive to fiscal discipline. The opposite 
arrangement often leads to sizable deficits and debts.’ The three countries with 
weakest budgetary procedures (those with the weakest finance minister, most 
parliamentary amendments, etc.) had deficits that averaged 11 percent of GDP 
in the 1980s, while the three countries with the strongest procedures had deficit 
ratios of  2 percent. The accumulated public debt stocks were also very differ- 
ent between these two sets of countrie~.~  Similar results are reported by Alesina 
et al. (1996) in their study of  20 Latin American  and Caribbean  countries. 
Using a methodology  quite similar to that of  von Hagen, they find that the 6 
countries with the strongest fiscal processes had, between 1980 and 1993, fis- 
cal surpluses that averaged 1.8 percent of GDP; the 7 countries with the weak- 
est processes had deficit ratios of 2.2 percent over the same period. 
3. More specifically, von Hagen (1992) constructs an index characterizing EU national budget 
processes on four grounds: (a)  strength of the prime minister or finance minister in budget negotia- 
tions; (b)  existence of overall budget targets fixed early on and limits on parliamentary powers of 
amendment; (c) transparency of the budget document: and (d)  limited discretion in the implemen- 
tation of the budget. 
4. More generally, Roubini and Sachs (1989a,b) and Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991) 
have shown that among OECD countries, those with proportional representation systems and frac- 
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Second, spending may be set by decentralized fiscal authorities representing 
particular geographical areas. The cases of Argentina and Brazil are instruc- 
tive.’ They are both federal countries in which over the last two decades many 
spending responsibilities have been transferred to the subfederal level. Lacking 
sufficient revenues of their own and facing unclear rules, subfederal govern- 
ments have systematically run deficits that de facto have become the responsi- 
bility of the federal authorities. There have generally been three mechanisms 
through  which  state and provincial  entities could “pass on”  their deficits: 
(a)  borrowing from state development banks, which in turn could rediscount 
their loans at the central bank-in  effect monetizing the subfederal deficits; 
(b)  obtaining discretionary lump sum transfers from the federal government, 
generally requested around election time and after large debts had been accu- 
mulated; and (c)  accumulating arrears with suppliers and creditors, which (for 
either legal or political reasons) were eventually cleared up by  the federal au- 
thorities. Understanding that at least part of the cost would be borne by others, 
subfederal governments have been tempted to overspend and overborrow. Simi- 
lar troubles affected the former Yugoslavia. They are also becoming increas- 
ingly severe in Russia, as Wallich (1992) and Sachs (1994) argue. 
Third, transfers may be determined by money-losing state enterprises facing 
soft budget constraints-for  instance in Mexico and Brazil in the 1970s or in 
Russia and some countries of Eastern Europe more recently. As Kornai (1979) 
emphasized, state firms have an incentive to pay excessive wages (thus simply 
reducing the profit stream that would go to the Treasury) and engage in large 
and risky investments (managers benefit from running larger firms but bear 
none of  the investment risk). Bankruptcy is not a real threat, as government 
subsidies and bailouts from state banks often extend the life of distressed firms. 
Lipton and Sachs (1990), among others, have pointed out that this problem 
became increasingly acute with the decline of Communism and the beginning 
of  transition. Holzmann (1991) estimates that in Eastern Europe during the 
1980s budgetary subsidies to state enterprises averaged almost 10 percent of 
GDP. 
The inefficiencies that arise when several groups or officials with redistribu- 
tive aims have control over fiscal policy have been recognized in the literature. 
Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981) and, more recently, Chari and Cole 
(1993) and Chari, Jones, and Marimon (1994) show that having the supply of 
local public goods financed with national or federal revenues creates incentives 
for pork barrel spending. Aizenman (1991) and Zarazaga (1993) have argued 
that if fiscal and/or monetary policy are decided upon in a decentralized man- 
ner, a “competitive externality” arises that gives the economy an inflationary 
5. The case of Argentina is studied in Jones, Sanguinetti, and Tommasi  1997 and World Bank 
1990a. b, and c  and that  of Brazil in  Shah  1990 and Bomfin and Shah  1991. Stein, Talvi, and 
Grisanti (chap. 5 in this  volume) discuss fiscal arrangements at  the subnational level for all of 
Latin America and the Caribbean. 40  And&  Velasco 
bias. What all these models have in common is that, because the benefits from 
spending accrue fully to each group, while the costs are spread over all groups, 
incentives are distorted and a “spending bias” emerges. 
As Alesina and Perotti (1994) stress, however, the models in the literature 
so far are essentially static, focusing on the level of expenditures rather than 
on the behavior of debt and deficik6  This chapter by  contrast, focuses on the 
dynamic aspects of fragmented fiscal policymaking in the context of an infinite 
horizon model. Fiscal authorities are confronted with an explicit intertemporal 
trade-off  high deficits today mean lower spending or higher taxes tomorrow. 
Does a divided government structure lead rational fiscal authorities to run debts 
and deficits that are “too high” in some well-defined sense? The model in sec- 
tion 2.3 below provides an affirmative answer to this question. If government 
net assets (the present value of future income streams minus outstanding debts) 
is the common property of  all fiscal authorities, then a problem arises that is 
logically quite similar to the “tragedy of the commons” that occurs in marine 
fisheries or public grazing lands (Levhari and Mirman  1980; Benhabib and 
Radner 1992). Two distortions are present if  n agents share the stock of the 
resource. First, each uses the whole stock and not one-nth of it as the basis for 
consumption or spending decisions. Second, the return on savings as perceived 
by one agent is the technological rate of return (the rate of interest or the rate 
of growth of natural resource stocks) minus what the other n -  1 agents take 
out. Hence, to the extent that savings depends positively on the rate of return, 
each agent undersaves (overspends in the case of fiscal policy, overexploits in 
the case of natural resources). This means that deficits are incurred and debts 
accumulated even in contexts where there is no incentive for intertemporal 
smoothing, so that a central planner guiding fiscal policy would run a balanced 
budget.’ In short, the model exhibits a “deficit bias.” 
But any empirically plausible model must account not only for debt accumu- 
lation. After all, since the borrowing binge of the 1970s and 1980s many coun- 
tries (particularly in Europe and Latin America) have drastically restructured 
their fiscal policies and curtailed debt growth. Indeed, the model of this paper 
can also account for fiscal stabilizations-that  is to say, changes in fiscal policy 
that end the process of debt accumulation. 
For that purpose I study trigger-strategy equilibria, in which interest groups 
coordinate on a zero-deficit path for spending and threaten to return to the 
excess-deficit path the period after a defection has been detected. Groups’ pay- 
offs depend on the outstanding stock of government debt. A fiscal stabilization 
6.  A partial exception is Chari and Cole 1993, who consider a two-period model. 
7. Of  course, this is not the only type of “political economy” explanation for the existence of 
budget deficits. An  important explanation is provided by  Persson and Svensson (1989),  Tabellini 
and Alesina (1990), and Alesina and Tabellini (1990). In their models, society is divided into 
groups with different preferences (over the composition of government spending, for instance). 
Because current majorities know that in the future a different majority with different preferences 
may be in control of fiscal policy, those currently in power attempt to “bind” the actions of their 
successors by leaving them a large public debt. 41  A Model of Endogenous Fiscal Deficits and Delayed Fiscal Reforms 
may not be sustainable from low levels of debt (high levels of government net 
assets), but may become sustainable once debt reaches a sufficiently high level. 
The intuition for this result is simple. As debt grows and the government be- 
comes poorer, the static efficiency gains associated with stabilization become 
more attractive relative to the payoff groups can obtain by continuing to trans- 
fer aggressively, until eventually low spending and stabilization become sus- 
tainable in equilibrium. Thus, the model suggests a rationale for the popular 
notion that “things have to get very bad before they can get better again.” Or, 
in the sense of Alesina and Drazen (1991), the model can generate delayed sta- 
bilizations. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 sets up the basic model, while 
section 2.3 characterizes a simple Markov-Nash equilibrium of  the dynamic 
game between the interest groups and derives the endogenous budget deficit. 
Section 2.4 introduces “trigger strategies,” and section 2.5 characterizes the 
“switching equilibrium” that results in a delayed fiscal reform. Section 2.6 ana- 
lyzes the effects of  adverse shocks, while section 2.7 offers a summary and 
some conclusions. 
2.2  The Basic Model 
There are n symmetric groups, indexed by  i,i = 1,2, . . . ,  n. Each can be 
thought of  as a particular constituency or recipient of  government largesse. 
Net transfers to group i-denoted  by  g,-can  be interpreted as subsidies to its 
members minus the taxes that group pays, or net spending on a public good 
that only benefits those in group i.  Hence, g, can be positive or negative, but 
there is a maximum negative transfer (tax), denoted by 2,  that can be extracted 
from any group. 
Any excess of expenditure over revenues can be financed by  borrowing in 
the world capital market at a constant gross real rate R, which is exogenous 
given the assumption that the economy is small and open. Accumulated debts 
are a joint liability of all n groups, as would be the case with the national debt 
in any country. The government budget constraint therefore is 
b,,,  =  Rb, +  y - 
where y  denotes exogenous nontax government revenue (e.g., income from 
state enterprises or transfers from abroad)8  and b,  is the stock of the internation- 
ally traded bond held by the government at time t, which can be interpreted as 
the gross international reserves minus outstanding public debt-both  earning 
or paying the interest rate R.  The variable z, represents a deadweight loss per 
period of time; conditions under which this cost is incurred are made explicit 
below. 
8. This serves simply as a shift parameter, which is useful in section 2.6 below. Before that, 
nothing changes if it is simply set to zero. 42  And&  Velasco 
As is usual in this kind of setting, we impose on the government the sol- 
vency condition 
(2)  !;ir  b,R-‘  2 0, 
which simply ensures that debt does not grow without bound. Solving equation 
(1) as of any time t and imposing equation (2)  yields 
(3) 
which has the standard interpretation that the present value of all net transfers 
as oft  cannot exceed the value of the government’s assets plus the present value 
of all of its net income (inclusive of possible deadweight losses). Adding [Rl 
(R -  I)] ng to both sides of equation (3) we obtain 
where w,  can be interpreted as the maximum wealth the government can have, 
starting from assets b, and given the expected  sequence {z,};~,. Notice from 
this definition that w, must be nonnegative for the government to remain sol- 
vent: otherwise at some later point transfers would have to be below -g, some- 
thing that is infeasible given our assumptions. 
How do groups interact in order to determine fiscal policy? The key assump- 
tion is that the central fiscal authority is weak, and that group i itself can deter- 
mine (subject to a constraint made explicit below) the sequence {g,};,.  While 
each group has many members, they act in a coordinated fashion (through a 
congressional leader or member of the cabinet, for example) in setting the level 
of net transfers g,. 
To ensure that the lack of coordination in ministers’ actions does not lead to 
a violation of the solvency condition, it is necessary to impose a rule that pre- 
vents ministers’ total desired net transfers from exceeding the maximum feasi- 
ble amount. Suppose that after groups decide on their target transfers gi,, these 
are satisfied by the central fiscal authority (the finance minister or the presi- 
dent) as long as 
(5)  g,,  I  (RIn)w,,  Vi  and  Vt 
Any  minister  whose  desired  net  transfer  violates  equation  (5) simply  gets 
zero.9 Application of this rule leads to c:=,  g, 5  Rw, for all i and all t. 
9. Note that this rule simply prevents solvency from being violated as a result of the lack of 
coordination among ministers. Why the government as a whole (represented by the finance minis- 
ter or president) chooses to remain solvent-or  not to default-is  a question beyond the scope of 
this paper. I simply assume away the possibility of default, as does most of the literature on optimal 
fiscal policy. For important papers that study default explicitly in similar contexts, see Bulow and 
Rogoff 1989, Atkeson 1991, and Chari and Kehoe 1993a and b. 43  A Model of Endogenous Fiscal Deficits and Delayed Fiscal Reforms 
The leader of group i maximizes the objective function 
with respect to gir  starting at each time t >  0, subject to equations (l),  (2), and 
(5). Thus, groups’ utility is an increasing function of the excess of the actual 
net transfer they receive over the minimum they could have received. I assume 
a logarithmic utility function in order to get closed-form solutions. 
Equations  (l), (2),  (5), and (6) provide  the  setting  for a dynamic  game 
among the  leaders  of  the  n groups.  Before  constructing  equilibria for that 
game, however, it is useful to ask about the level of transfers  that would be 
chosen by a benevolent planner that maximized the joint welfare of all groups 
(with equal weights for each). It is easy to show that, because groups’ subjec- 
tive rate of time preference is equal to the world rate of interest, the planner 
would  to each group to transfer one-nth of  the government’s permanent  in- 
come. Thus, 
(7) 
which-if  all n groups follow it-ensures  that debt is constant if z, is constant. 
This policy is used below as a benchmark with which to compare game out- 
comes. 
Assume finally that, if and only if all groups agree to stabilize, the dead- 
weight loss disappears: 
-..  n 
[z otherwise. 
Notice that if all groups follow the transfer policy in equation (7),  then z, = 0 
for all t; as a result, debt is constant throughout. I will refer to such policies as 
being associated with “fiscal stabilization.” 
The assumption on the deadweight loss in equation (8) can be justified by 
the presence of  static efficiency gains associated with stabilization. The sug- 
gested interpretation is that government resources are no longer wasted in deal- 
ing with lobbyists, in the spirit of Krueger (1974) and Bhagwati (1982). Alter- 
natively, following Alesina  and Drazen  (1991), the net gain  to government 
finances associated with stabilization could be interpreted as a switch to non- 
distortionary taxes or a lowering of tax collection costs, so that the government 
gets more revenue (net of costs) for each unit of  output obtained from the 
private sector. Or, one could assume that stabilization  produces a permanent 
increase in government income, perhaps in transfers from abroad intended to 44  And&  Velasco 
reward sound fiscal behavior. All that matters for the results below is that the 
gains from stabilizing extend beyond  the dynamic benefits of curtailing net 
transfers and debt accumulation. In the interest of realism, I henceforth assume 
that z <  y. 
The timing of actions is as follows. The economy enters period t with gov- 
ernment assets Rb,. Government net transfers then take place, with the n groups 
simultaneously setting their transfers gc,.  The deadweight loss then occurs ac- 
cording to equation (8). 
I now characterize more formally the game among the groups and its corre- 
sponding equilibrium: 
DEFINITION  1.  A strategy is a sequence {g,};,for  each playel: 
DEFINITION  2. An equilibrium  for this game is represented by a set of strate- 
gies, one for each playel; such that no group can improve its total payoff 
by a unilateral change in strategy at any point in the game. 
2.3  Endogenous Government Deficits 
In this section I focus on simple Markovian strategies in which net transfers 
are a function of  the state variable only, and temporarily assume away more 
complex behavior, such as trigger strategies, based on the previous history of 
the game. 
Since the  setting is  log-linear,  I construct  an  equilibrium  in which  each 
player uses policy rules such that actions are linear functions of the relevant 
state variable: 
(9)  g,,  =  p.  +  +Rb, 7 
where p and + are coefficients to be endogenously determined. 
employ rule (9) for all s  2  t. Then, debt evolves according to 
(10) 
Group i's best response is therefore the solution to the problem 
(11) 
subject to equations (5)  and (10). Using this best response, and using the fact 
that all groups are symmetric, one can endogenously determine the coefficients 
p. and +. 
(12) 
Suppose that  starting at time t, group i expects that all other groups will 
b,+l =  RbJl  - (n - 1)+1 - (n - Up  +  y - z, - g,,. 
V(b,)  =  maxUog(g, +  i?) +  R-'V(bf+l)l, 
R'I 
The Euler equation that corresponds to problem (1  1) is 
&+,  +  g  = (g,/ +  i?"  - (n - 1NI. 
Suppose next that  p.  and + are such that equation (7) does not occur in 
equilibrium (we will check later, of course, whether this supposition is self- 45  A Model of Endogenous Fiscal Deficits and Delayed Fiscal Reforms 
confirming). It follows that in equation (10) we  may  replace z  for z, Vt.  As 
the appendix shows in greater detail, combining the resulting equation with 
equations (10) and (12), and imposing symmetry across all n groups we obtain 
so that each group’s policy rule is 
Notice that +R <  R/n, so that rule (5) is satisfied. 
Clearly, the policy in equation (14) is a strategy in the sense of definition 1. 
It is also feasible, in that rule (5)  is satisfied.’O Then a set of such a strategies, 
one for each group, constitutes an equilibrium in the sense of  definition 2: 
the strategies are best responses to themselves. The resulting Markov-Nash 
equilibrium is subgame perfect. That is because the strategies are specified as 
a function of the state (in this case debt), not of time. Hence, no group leader 
has an incentive to change strategies as a result of the mere passage of time. 
Notice also that the policy rule in equation (14) does not correspond to the 
“stabilizing” net transfers rule in equation (7). Thus, given equation (8), the 
conjecture that z, = z Vt is confirmed. 
Substituting equation (14) into equation (I), we obtain 
where the inequality follows from the fact that R/[1 + n(R -  l)] < 1 as long 
asn > 1. 
This result can also be expressed in terms of government wealth. It is the 
case that  1 -  n+  = 1/[1 + n(R - l)]. Using this result in equation (A5) 
we have 
(16)  <  1.  w,,,=  R 
W,  1 + n(R - 1) 
Hence, w,  goes to zero only asymptotically, and solvency condition 2 in the 
text is satisfied. 
Expressions (15) and (16) show two sides of  the same result: there is an 
endogenously determined fiscal deficit, debt is accumulated and government 
wealth decreases over time: fragmented fiscal policymaking leads to a “defi- 
cit bias.” 
10. The solvency condition (2) is also satisfied, as I show below. 46  And&  Velasco 
Fig. 2.1  Time path of deficits and related variables 
How does the deficit bias depend on the number n of interest groups, and 
hence on the degree of fragmentation of the policymaking process? Since 4 = 
(R - l)/[l + n(R - l)],  given policy rule (14) it is clear that each group’s 
desired transfers are decreasing in n. However, total transfers ng, are easily 
shown to be increasing inn.  This is reflected in equation (16),  which shows that 
the speed with which government wealth falls is also an increasing function of 
n. Hence, the larger the number of  interest groups (the larger the degree of 
fragmentation in policymaking), the greater the deficit bias. 
Figure 2.1 shows the behavior of transfers g,, bond-holdings b,, and govern- 
ment wealth w,  as a function of time.” The time path of transfers is particularly 
interesting: they are initially positive and large, fall as government wealth falls, 
and eventually become positive (that is, groups eventually begin paying taxes). 
In the limit, as time goes to infinity and government wealth goes to zero, taxes 
converge to their maximum feasible level g. 
The reason for this set of results-particularly  the “deficit bias”-is  simple. 
Property rights are not defined over each group’s share of  overall revenue or 
debt. A portion of any government wealth not spent by one group will be spent 
by the other group. Hence, there are incentives to raise net transfers above the 
collectively efficient rate. As in the “tragedy of the commons” literature, there 
is overconsumption and overborrowing. 
Using equations (14) and (15) in equation (6),  one can easily obtain the 
utility that each group obtains along this equilibrium path 
11. Notice that initial bond-holdings can be positive or negative, as long as they are not so 
negative as to make initial wealth nonpositive. As drawn, initial bond-holdings are negative-that 
is to say, the government is a debtor. 47  A Model of Endogenous Fiscal Deficits and Delayed Fiscal Reforms 
where “m” stands for “Markov.” 
Consider now  what is the utility that accrues to players if  stabilization is 
achieved-that  is, if transfer behavior accords with the planner’s solution. If at 
time t each player were to agree to transfer according to equation (7), govern- 
ment debt would remain constant forever, and the corresponding value would 
be 
vqb,) = (L)log(  (R - l)b,  + y  + ng 
R- 1  n 
where “s” stands for “stabilization.” Comparing equations (17) and (18) we 
see that V (b,) > Vm  (b,)  for any b,. Relative to the stabilizing outcome, the 
path involving a fiscal deficit is characterized by  two inefficiencies. First, an 
intratemporal one: lobbying imposes a deadweight loss, reflected in the fact 
that z > 0. Second, an intertemporal one: given that government nontax reve- 
nue is constant and the rate of discount is equal to the rate of interest, a benevo- 
lent planner maximizing a weighted average of the utility of both groups would 
never find it optimal to borrow. Here the groups borrow, purely for strategic 
reasons, and this results in lower utility for all players.’2 
2.4  Incentive Constraints and Debt Dependence 
Can the two groups, acting in a decentralized manner, ever coordinate on a 
better outcome? Can they ever coordinate on stabilization, with net transfers 
at levels such that the fiscal deficit is eliminated and government debt growth 
stopped? To  answer these questions, I focus on trigger strategy equilibria, and 
characterize equilibrium paths along which groups receive utilities that are at 
least as high as those that they could obtain by higher immediate net transfers 
and suffering retaliation later on. 
DEFINITION  3. A  trigger strategy is an implicitly agreed upon net transfer 
path for each player; plus the  threat  of  a  reversion  to the  stationary 
Markov-Nash path  forever the period afer  a defection takes place. 
Suppose the agreed-upon net transfers path is the stabilizing one, described 
above in equation (7).13 If  implemented starting from a level of debt b,, such a 
12. Notice that log n + [R/(R -  l)] log [R/[1 -  n(R -  l)]} <  0, so that Vs  (b,) > V“  (b,) even 
if z = 0, so that no intratemporal distortion exists. 
13. Here I follow the tradition of the folk-theorem literature for repeated games-see,  for in- 
stance, Fudenberg and Maskin 1986-and  the dynamic game literature-Chari  and Kehoe 1993a 48  And&  Velasco 
path would yield utility as in equation (18). A group can always defect from 
the agreed-upon path, and will do so when the utility associated with defection 
is higher than that associated with the path. 
What is the optimal defection? The nondefecting groups obviously continue 
to follow the policy in equation (7) during the period of defection. Given that 
starting the next period all will revert to the Markov-Nash path, the defecting 




Vd(b,)  =  maxIlog(g,, +  g) +  R-'V"(b,+,)), 
&=,I 
where y = { 1 -  [(n -  l)/n] [(R -  l)/R]) < 1, and to equation (5).  Notice that 
in equation (19) V"  (b,+,)  is given by equation (17), and "d"  stands for "defec- 
tion." The solution to this problem is 
Note that, since y [(R -  l)/R] < l/n, condition (5) is satisfied: even when de- 
viating and requesting relatively larger transfers, the deviating group attempts 
to get less than one-nth of available resources. 
Using equations (19), (20), and (21), total utility from defecting when assets 
equal b, can be written as 
R- 1  1  + n(R - 1) 
R 
+
 (&)~Og'  - IOg(l  + n(R - 1) 
Notice that, as one would expect, Vd (b,)  > Vm  (b,),  for the expression in the 
second line of  equation (22) is positive  as long as  II > 1. By cheating and 
and b, Benhabib and Velasco 1996-in  asking whether the first-best path (in this case the path 
with constant debt) can be sustained through trigger strategies. But clearly, in this model as in the 
earlier ones in the literature, one could also ask whether other, less desirable, outcomes can be 
sustained as well. 49  A Model of Endogenous Fiscal Deficits and Delayed Fiscal Reforms 
obtaining net transfers according to equation (21) at time t,  while the remaining 
(n -  1) groups adhere to the more frugal rule (7) during that period, group  i 
increases its utility.14 
We can now return to the question of whether the stabilizing, constant-debt 
path can ever be sustained. If both  groups follow such a path, they receive 
utilities V (b,)  as shown in equation (18). If a group defects, on the other hand, 
it receives Vd  (b,),  as shown in equation (22). Individual rationality dictates that 
the agreed-upon path will be followed if  and only if  V  (b,) L Vd  (b,).  Using 
equations (1 8) and (22), this is equivalent to 
(23)  log[  (R  - 1~1  +  Y  +  ng  1 +  n(R - 1) 
(R - 1)b, +  y  +  ng - i]  R- 1 
+  - (n - 1)(3]. 
When equation (23) is satisfied, stabilization becomes self-enforcing. 
The only endogenous variable in equation (23) is the stock of  government 
debt. There are two cases, given  that the left-hand side of equation (23) is 
always positive and monotonically decreasing in b,. First, if the right-hand side 
of equation (23) is negative,  equation (23) is satisfied for all levels of debt. 
Second, if the right-hand side of equation (23) is positive, there is one level of 
debt for which equation (23) is satisfied with equality. Figure 2.2 plots V  (6,) 
and Vd  (b,)  as a function of b, in this second case. At low levels of debt, total 
utility from defecting exceeds total utility from stabilizing, but this situation is 
reversed as debt grows. The schedules cross once, at the point labeled b*. 
Individual rationality dictates that along an equilibrium path a group’s utility 
must be at least as high as the utility associated with deviating from that path. 
In the second case above, condition (23) can be interpreted as revealing that 
this constraint binds at some levels of government debt but not at others. In 
particular, it binds at only low levels of debt: as long as the government is rich, 
groups are tempted to defect and consume as much as they can. 
But incentives change with higher debt: because stabilization involves the 
elimination of the deadweight loss, the payoff associated with defecting falls 
more quickly than that associated with stabilization as debt rises. Put differ- 
ently, the  static gain associated with stabilizing becomes  more desirable to 
groups as debt increases and the government becomes poorer. Only when the 
14. In fact, the second line in equation (22) has a ready interpretation along these lines. The 
parameter y < 1 is the share of  government wealth left over after all other (n - 1) groups have 
done their spending in the case of  defection; the expression Rl[1 + n(R -  l)] = 1 -  (n -  1)+1 is 
the share of government wealth left over after all other (n - 1) groups have done their spending 
in the case of Markov-Nash behavior. The difference of  the logarithm of the two is the welfare 




Fig. 2.2  Utility levels from stabilizing versus defecting 
stock of  debt is so high that the payoff associated with defection falls below 
that associated with stabilization does the latter become self-sustaining. 
2.5  Delayed Stabilization 
I have shown that stabilization may be sustainable from some levels of the 
stock of debt, but not from others. In particular, it could well be that the econ- 
omy starts out at a level of debt sufficiently low such that stabilization is not 
possible.  But it is not clear thus far whether and how the economy will get 
to the debt threshold where stabilization can be achieved. In what follows I 
characterize  “switching  equilibria”  of  the  sort described  by  Benhabib  and 
Radner (1992): groups follow an agreed-upon path until debt reaches a level 
such that it is individually rational to stabilize. At that point, a “switch” takes 
place and the fiscal deficit is eliminated. Because the necessary debt accumula- 
tion takes time, stabilization is “delayed,” as in Alesina and Drazen 1991. 
Just as in the case of simple trigger strategies, there are many paths for net 
transfers that are potentially sustainable. To  keep matters simple, I focus on 
the case in which  groups follow simple Markov-Nash transfer policies until 
the switch takes ~1ace.I~ 
15. I have established that stabilization will occur when debt reaches b*. Any set of spending 
policies that takes debt from b, to b*, and that is sustainable through the threat of reversion to 
Markov if anyone deviates, will give rise to a switching equilibrium. There could be many such 
paths. More generally, it would be of  interest to search for the best switching path; that would 
involve the difficult task of jointly choosing the best sustainable path to the switching point and 
after the switching point. To the best of my knowledge, there exist no general results characterizing 
this kind of “second best” equilibria. For some limited progress, see Benhabib and Rustichini 1991 
and Benhabib and Velasco 1996. 51  A Model of Endogenous Fiscal Deficits and Delayed Fiscal Reforms 
DEFINITION  4. A switching path is given by 
(R  - l)b, +  y - z  + 
~  ("  ')g]  if  b,  <b* 
if  b,  2 b*  1[ 
R 
(!)[(R - l)b, + rl 
DEFINITION  5. A switching strategy consists of  following the path in dejni- 
tion 4 as long as no one deviates. ga  deviation takes place, groups revert 
to Markov-Nash net transfers after one period. Hence, a switching strat- 
egy is nothing but a generalized trigger strategy. 
DEFINITION  6.  A switching equilibrium  for this game is represented by a set 
of switching strategies, one for each player; such that no group can im- 
prove its total payoff by a unilateral change in strategy at any point in 
the game. 
To  characterize such an equilibrium one must describe the behavior of the 
economy prior to reaching b*. If  all groups consume according to equation 
(14), it will take T periods to reach b*, where T is the smallest number such that 
R 
1 +  n(R - 1)  1 +  n(R - 1) 
(24) b,  =  b, 
which is simply the solution to difference equation (15). 
If  stabilization takes place, equations (23) and (24) jointly determine the 
stock of  debt and the time at which it will occur. In figure 2.3, equation (23) 
appears as the schedule RR and equation (24) appears as the schedule SS. 
Their intersection occurs at T and b*. 
As usual, to be an equilibrium this path must be such that the continuation 
value at every point  of  the trajectory (that is, the utility  of  behaving in  a 
Markov-Nash fashion until b reaches b* and stabilizing thereafter) must be at 
least as large as the value of defecting. Once b 2 b* this is indeed the case, by 
the definition of b*. What about when b <  b*? In that case, a defecting group 
must solve 
Vd(b,)  =  max(log(gt, +  g) +  R-'V"(b,,,)}  (25) 
subject to 
11, 
(26)  b,,,  =  Rb,U  - (n - 1)+1  + (Y - 2,) - (n - 1)~  - g,, 
and to equation (5). But this is exactly the problem solved in computing the 
Markov-Nash equilibrium above. We know the corresponding solution is that 52  And&  Velasco 
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Fig. 2.3  Equilibrium time of stabilization 
in equation (14). Hence, a group that-when  confronted with the policy speci- 
fied in definition 4 for the case of b < b*-chooses  to maximize its current- 
period utility, knowing that everyone will revert to Markov-Nash behavior in 
the future, does exactly what definition 4 specifies. The path is therefore also 
self-sustaining for the range b <  b*. 
The conclusion is that the strategies for each group contained in definition 
5 do indeed constitute an equilibrium in the sense of definition 6: they are best 
responses to themselves. The associated equilibrium has two phases. In  the 
first one, when debt is low, net transfers by  groups are high, a fiscal deficit 
occurs, and debt is accumulated. In the second, when debt reaches the relevant 
threshold, net transfers fall, the deficit is closed, and debt accumulation ceases. 
We  therefore have a delayed stabilization or, more precisely, a delayed fiscal 
reform. 
2.6  The Effects of Economic Crises 
The  possibility  of  delayed  fiscal  stabilization places  the  economy  in  a 
second-best situation, in which exogenous shocks can have unexpected effects 
on welfare. Hirschman (1985), in the context of the Latin American experi- 
ence, conjectured that adverse external shocks may prompt economic reforms 
and thereby have unexpected beneficial effects. In the same vein, Drazen and 
Grilli (1993) showed that an economic crisis may alter relative payoffs in such 
a way  as to reduce the equilibrium delay in implementing a stabilization pro- 
gram and thereby increase welfare. That paradoxical result also holds in the 
present model. 
For simplicity, identify an economic crisis with a permanent fall (as of time 
0) in exogenous nontax revenue y. This could be interpreted, for instance, as 53  A Model of Endogenous Fiscal Deficits and Delayed Fiscal Reforms 
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Fig. 2.4  Effect of shock to nontax revenue on time of stabilization 
b 
an adverse terms-of-trade shock that lowers the value of  income from state 
enterprises (oil in Mexico or Indonesia, copper in Chile or Zambia). 
Such a shock has two effects.I6  First, it lowers the debt threshold and the 
length of  time that elapses before fiscal stabilization takes place. As can be 
seen in figure 2.4, both RR and SS shift to the left; the new intersection is such 
that both b*  and T fa11.I7 Ceteris paribus, that raises groups' welfare: loosely, 
since the Markov-Nash path yields lower utility than does the stabilizing path, 
switching from one to the other at an earlier date must be good for welfare. 
But second, the permanent fall in y lowers total government resources available 
for making net transfers; ceteris paribus, that lowers groups' welfare. 
Hence, the sign of the net effect is ambiguous, leaving open the possibility 
that the discounted utility that groups derive from government transfers could 
indeed rise as a result of the adverse shock! 
2.7  Conclusions 
Economists have spent much time and energy modeling the allocation of 
resources in those regions of  the modem economy where the market system 
indeed does allocate resources. But there is a very large portion of such econo- 
mies-the  government sector-within  which there are no private property 
rights, and where the allocation of resources does not follow market forces. If 
16. Formal proofs of the statements that follow are available from the author upon request. 
17. This is not obvious from the picture, but can be shown algebraically. 54  And&  Velasco 
we move beyond the view of government as a monolithic entity that behaves 
like a single individual, economics must provide an account of how economic 
decisions are made among government groups, and how politics both frames 
and determines those decisions. 
This paper suggests one of the simplest possible models of  a government 
with many controllers and fragmented policymaking-one  in which govern- 
ment net income is a “commons” from which interest groups can extract re- 
sources.  This  setup has  striking  macroeconomic  implications.  First,  fiscal 
deficits emerge even when there are no reasons for intertemporal smoothing. 
Second, those  deficits can be  sometimes eliminated,  but only after  a delay 
during which government debt is built up. Thus, the model offers a plausible 
rationale for the tardiness in stabilizing that we often observe in real-life econ- 
omies. 
Appendix 
Recall that in equation (4) in the text we defined the variable 
y- z+  ng  wr  =  6, + 
R-1  ’ 
expressed here for constant z,. It follows from equation (Al) and budget con- 
straint (1) in the text that 
Using definition (Al), we can write the policy rule as 
(A31  g,,  +  =  +Rw,. 
It follows that 
where the second equality comes from Euler equation (12) in the text. 
Using equation (A3) in (A2) we have 
=  R(l - n+). 
wr 
Combining equations (A4) and (A5) we have 
(A61  1 - (n - l)+  =  R(1 - n+), 55  A Model of Endogenous Fiscal Deficits and Delayed Fiscal Reforms 
which implies 4 = (R - 1)/[1 + n(R - l)]. This, together with definition 
(Al), reveals that p.  = [RO, -  z) + (n -  l)g]/[l + n(R -  l)], as it appears in 
the text. 
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